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Sovereign risk is deﬁned as a country’s ability-to-pay and willingness-to-pay
its debt. This paper examines how cabinet reshuﬄes aﬀecting the ministry
of ﬁnance or economics are perceived by sovereign bond holders in twelve
Latin American countries from 1992 to 2007. We ﬁnd that such political news
instantaneously increases bond spreads. Furthermore, spreads trend signiﬁcantly
upward in the 40 days leading up to the minister change, before ﬂattening out
on a higher level in the 40 days thereafter. Evidence suggests that uncertainty
about the future course of economic policy and the government’s willingness-
to-pay increases reﬁnancing costs for respective emerging markets.
JEL classiﬁcation: F30, F34, G14, H63.
Keywords: political instability, country risk, bond spreads, Latin America.
¤Acknowledgments: I am especially indebted to Thorsten Nestmann, Marcel Peter, Isabel Schn-
abel, Dieter Urban and Beatrice Weder. I would like to thank as well Patricia Alvarez-Plata, Michel
Bouchet, Ricardo Caballero, Bertrand Groslambert, Ashok Kaul, Roman Kräussl and Christoph
Trebesch for comments and discussion. Furthermore, I am grateful to participants at the Annual
Meetings of the Verein für Socialpolitik, the European Economics Association, the Verein für So-
cialpolitik: Research Committee Development Economics, the Public Choice Society, the Latin
American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA), the Austrian Economics Association
(NoEG), in particular Helmut Stix, at the KOF Research Seminar of the ETH Zürich, particu-
larly Axel Dreher, at Deutsche Bank Research, especially Maria Lanzeni, at the CERAM Research
Seminar and at Max Planck Institute’s Econ Workshop, in particular Martin Hellwig. Of course,
any errors are solely my own.
Email address: Christoph.Moser@uni-mainz.de
11 Introduction
Finance Minister Roberto Lavagna’s unexpected departure
has highlighted tensions within the government of President
Nestor Kirchner, and raises questions over the sustainability of
its conservative ﬁscal policy [..] ﬁscal discipline is under strain,
with pressure for more spending from populist politicians.1
Political events matter to ﬁnancial markets and the literature on sovereign debt
motivates a link between political risk and sovereign risk. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
famously distinguish between a country’s ability-to-pay and a country’s willingness-
to-pay its debt. Since sovereign debt repayment can hardly be enforced legally in case
of payment arrears, the honoring of contractual obligations becomes a matter of cost-
beneﬁt calculus for the incumbent government. If the costs of repayment outweigh
the beneﬁts of repayment, the debtor country will interrupt its debt servicing. While
some recent studies ﬁnd evidence for an inﬂuence of political variables on ﬁnancial
vulnerability and sovereign defaults,2 the decision to default on sovereign debt ﬁnally
boils down to a political decision at the executive level.
Beyond structural political variables, the ﬁnancial press suggests that political
news are a major inﬂuence on ﬁnancial markets. This view ﬁnds support in the
academic literature, especially for emerging market economies during ﬁnancial crises.
Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) ﬁnd that nearly one ﬁfth of the largest stock price
movements during the Asian crisis were associated with news of political nature. Zoli
(2005) ﬁnds Brazilian government announcements to raise the public sector surplus
as well as concrete ﬁscal policy actions, such as budgetary cuts, implied a reduction
in the perceived risk of default during the "conﬁdence crisis" in 2002-03. Baig et
al. (2006) extend the mentioned analysis and observe similar results for Poland and
mixed results for Turkey.
1Financial Times (2005).
2The political variables considered are often of an institutional nature and change slowly over
time, e.g. parliamentary system, political polarization, political elections and number of veto play-
ers. See for instance Bussiere and Mulder (2000), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2004), Manasse et
al. (2003) and Kohlscheen (2004).
2The literature on the political (-economy) dimension of borrowing and debt re-
payment is quite limited so far. One notable exception are Aizenman and Powell
(1998), who model governments as a set of competing groups. The authors argue
that in the absence of a strong center (ﬁnance ministry) collective action problems
can lead to a very low public savings rate and a high borrowing rate, respectively. In
a similar vein, Santiso (2003) stresses that ﬁnance or economics ministers are playing
a pivotal role for emerging market governments by communicating with international
ﬁnancial markets and ensuring market conﬁdence.3 Finally, Baecker (1999) states
that changing governments or even changing moods within a government can suﬃce
to change a country’s debt servicing stance.
This paper argues that ﬁnance or economics minister changes may reveal impor-
tant signals for market participants about the government’s future policy course. In
particular, a ﬁnance minister change may implicitly or explicitly signal a marginal
change in the government’s willingness-to-pay by altering its expected ﬁscal policy
stance. This channel touches directly on the perceived probability of default of a
sovereign bond. More indirectly, an economics minister change may alter expecta-
tions about the future growth potential of a country, aﬀecting a country’s ability to
service its debt. Following the eﬃcient market hypothesis, asset prices should always
reﬂect all information publicly available. Hence, if a minister change oﬀers new in-
formation, asset prices are expected to adjust instantly. Ganapolsky and Schmukler
(2001) investigate the reaction of capital markets to Argentine policy announcement
and news reports during the „Tequila crisis“ and ﬁnd a negative short-term eﬀect
on bond prices due to the replacement of Argentine’s ﬁnance minister Domingo
Cavallo, the renowned, long-serving architect of the (once successful) Argentine cur-
rency board. Nogues and Grandes (2001) also ﬁnd a „Cavallo-eﬀect“ as exempliﬁed
in higher bond spreads. But both examples are conﬁned to a single, well-known
ﬁnance minister change.
3The exact wording of the quote is as follows, „One basic rule of the conﬁdence game [in
international ﬁnancial markets] is then to be very careful when nominating the oﬃcial government
voicer. For investors it is mainly the ministry of economics or ﬁnance or the governor of the
central bank. He will be chosen not only for his or her political and technical abilities but also for
his capacities to play the game that is to ensure market conﬁdence and strengthen market loyalty.“
3This study contributes to the empirical literature on sovereign risk in two ways.
First, we provide evidence for the impact of political risk, measured as political in-
stability within the government, on sovereign bond markets.4 We examine whether
ﬁnancial markets are sensitive to political instability stemming from cabinet changes
involving key policy makers like the ﬁnance or economics minister. Daily bond
spreads and a newly-collected data set for twelve Latin American economies over
the period 1992 to 2007 allow us testing for changes in the level of bond spreads in
the short run. Second, this paper sheds light on a country’s willingness-to-pay and,
hence, the political dimension of sovereign risk, since in particular ﬁnance minister
changes may convey important signals about the future ﬁscal policy course.
The paper’s main ﬁndings are as follows. We ﬁnd evidence that ﬁnancial markets
are indeed susceptible to political instability in Latin America. First, we ﬁnd a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant contemporaneous eﬀect of the minister change on bond spreads
on the announcement day. Second, mean-comparison tests show that sovereign bond
spreads are signiﬁcantly higher in the 40 days before compared to the 40 days after
the political event. This signiﬁcant level-eﬀect holds true for the overall sample as
well as for the crisis and non-crisis sub-samples. Third, bond spreads exhibit a signif-
icant upward trend in the run-up and ﬂatten out on a higher level in the aftermath
of the cabinet change. Interestingly, countries that already signal some vulnerabil-
ity, with secondary market spreads trading above 1000 basis points, turn out to be
particularly aﬀected by such government instability. We conclude that bond holders
are apparently sensitive to signals within the government that may warrant a new
ﬁscal policy and willingness-to-pay assessment.
The remainder of this paper: Chapters 2 and 3 provide a review of the relevant
literature and discuss why political instability is expected to impact sovereign bond
prices. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the empirical strategy and results. Conclusions follow.
4To our best knowledge no systematic study on the link between government instability and
ﬁnancial markets has been pursued so far. Reasons for this clear lack of cross-country evidence
are twofold. On the one hand, factors associated with political risk are of qualitative nature and
consequently hard to quantify. On the other hand, even though the relatively recent "Database
of Political Institutions" oﬀers data on political and institutional features (for further details, see
Beck et al., 2001), the availability of reliable data is still very limited. In contrast to that we are
interested in political events that shape the expectations of market participants in the short run.
42 Review of the literature
The literature relevant to our research question spans from the sovereign risk liter-
ature, ﬁnancial crises theories and bond literature to ﬁnancial markets studies that
deal with announcement eﬀects.
Political risk constitutes an important determinant of country risk. For our pur-
poses we follow Bilson et al. (2001), who deﬁne political risk as "the risk that arises
from the potential actions of governments and other inﬂuential domestic forces,
which threaten expected returns on investment."5 If the ﬁnancial obligation is issued
by a sovereign entity, creditors face sovereign risk. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) were
the ﬁrst to stress an important characteristic of sovereign debt. Sovereign defaults
are determined not only by the country’s ability-to-pay but also by its willingness-to-
pay its debt due to limited international enforceability in case of payment arrears.6
Lee (1991) and Nunnenkamp and Picht (1989) empirically test whether rescheduling
events can be explained by the willingness to pay approach.7 Even though the deter-
minants of the willingness-to-pay are expected to include institutional and political
variables, both studies interestingly only rely on macroeconomic fundamentals that
impact the relative costs and beneﬁts of debt-servicing.8
Closely linked to political risk is the concept of political instability, which is
generally deﬁned as the propensity of an imminent government change, either by
constitutional (new elections or cabinet crises) or unconstitutional means (coups
d’état or revolutions). Several authors study the evolution of bond prices and spreads
around government changes via political elections.9 Pantzalis et al. (2000) ﬁnd posi-
5For a survey of deﬁnitions of country risk and political risk, see Bouchet et al. (2003, ch. 2).
6While most studies restrict their investigation to the ﬁrst dimension using solvency and liq-
uidity indicators such as the debt-to-GDP ratio, the debt-service-to-exports ratio or the import
coverage there is still relatively little known about the second dimension. A noteworthy exception
is Kohlscheen (2004) who ﬁnds that parliamentary democracies experience a lower probability to
default than presidential systems due to a higher number of veto players.
7Lee (1993) discusses whether a country’s creditworthiness can be explained by its "willingness".
8Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) model the willingness-to-pay as a function of macroeconomic
volatility. The more volatile a country’s income, the more important is its access to international
capital markets to smooth consumption over time and the higher the costs associated with default.
It is assumed that borrowing only occurs if the country has not defaulted in any period before.
9Political instability can negatively aﬀect economic growth and/or investment as shown inter
alia by Barro (1991), Alesina et al. (1996) and Alesina and Perotti (1996). For a comprehensive
survey on political instability and economics, see Carmignani (2003).
5tive abnormal returns in the two weeks prior to the election due to dwindling policy
uncertainty. Alternatively, Block and Vaaler (2004) and Vaaler et al. (2005) oﬀer
a political business cycle interpretation. They ﬁnd that bond yields demanded by
international bond holders are conditional on the partisan orientation of the incum-
bent government and its likelihood to stay in power.
The literature on the determinants of secondary market spreads dates back to
Edwards (1984, 1986) who empirically studies the pricing of public and publicly
guaranteed loans and bonds.10 Boehmer and Megginson (1990) are the ﬁrst authors
that incorporate not only a country’s ability but also its willingness to service its
debt in their empirical speciﬁcation. Payment arrears and the cumulative level of
U.S. banks’ exposure in developing countries, employed as rough proxies for political
will, turn out signiﬁcant. In a recent study on sovereign spreads Ferrucci (2003)
asserts that the divergence between market determined spreads and his model-based
benchmark might be due to the exclusion of political risk or "willingness-to-pay". In
two related papers Mauro et al. (2002, 2006) compare sovereign bond spreads of the
ﬁrst wave of globalization with its counterparts in modern times. The authors ﬁnd
that domestic news exhibit a less pronounced impact on modern bonds including
eight emerging markets than on historical ones. Furthermore, bonds tend to co-move
more strongly nowadays. Akitoby and Stratmann (2006) assess the inﬂuence of ﬁscal
policy on sovereign bond spreads. The results show that cuts in current spending
have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on spreads, while increases in tax revenues do not
enter signiﬁcantly. Finally, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2006) oﬀer an important contribution
to the hotly debated issue of IMF-induced investor moral hazard, by analyzing
sovereign bond market reactions to the unanticipated non-bailout of Russia in 1998.
Most studies of this strand of literature are restricted to quarterly or yearly data.
In contrast to that there is a nascent but growing literature on various announce-
ment eﬀects on daily sovereign bond spreads. Several studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant short-
term reactions to sovereign rating actions and announcements (e.g. Kaminsky and
Schmukler, 2002, and Gande and Parsley, 2005). Andritzky et al. (2005) investi-
10For a discussion of the determinants of primary bond spreads or so-called "launch spreads" see
for instance Eichengreen and Mody (1998), Min et al. (2003) and Kamin and von Kleist (1999).
6gate how emerging market bond markets react to macroeconomic announcements.
While there is surprisingly no evidence of a systematic eﬀect on the level of spreads
(with the exception of rating announcements), announcements induce some market
volatility. IMF (2001) explains movements in daily emerging market spreads by U.S.
10-year and 3-month yields, Nasdaq returns as well as the Volatility index (VIX)
of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), a proxy for global risk aversion.
Furthermore, Zoli (2005) and Baig et al. (2006) ﬁnd some evidence that news on
ﬁscal policy actions and announcements move bond markets in the short run.
Finally, a strand of the ﬁnancial crisis literature incorporates political variables.
For instance, Obstfeld (1995) outlines the basic logic of the second generation of
ﬁnancial crisis models. If fundamentals lie in the so-called intermediate range, mul-
tiple equilibria and self-fulﬁlling expectations can occur. Hence, market expectations
may determine the equilibrium, opening the door for political variables inﬂuencing
market sentiment (e.g. Krugman, 1996, and Jeanne, 1997). Bussiere and Mulder
(2000) empirically show that political instability has a strong impact on economic
vulnerability for countries with weak economic fundamentals and low international
reserves. Finally, Chang (2005) has recently presented a theoretical framework that
allows for the simultaneous determination of ﬁnancial crises and political crises.
3 How does political instability feed into bond spreads?
Under the semi-strong form of the eﬃcient market hypothesis,11 security prices are
assumed to reﬂect all public information and to adjust swiftly to the arrival of new
public information. Hence, political instability as exempliﬁed by a minister change
is expected to aﬀect asset prices, if and only if, the minister change contains new
information. If markets fully anticipate the event or an information leakage occurs,
prices will not react at all.
11Even though empirical evidence is somehow mixed, the semi-strong form of eﬃcient market
hypothesis enjoys wide acceptance.






where (pd) denotes the probability of default and (i*) the risk-free interest rate.12
Since our data is restricted to public or publicly guaranteed debt, we are concerned
with "sovereign risk", i.e. the risk that a government defaults on or not fully honors
its bond contracts to foreigners (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1996). Macroeconomic and
political indicators determine the perceived probability of default and hence the
sovereign bond spread.13 One of the most important determinants of the probabil-
ity of default is the level and evolution of public debt. The following simple debt
sustainability equation will clarify how cabinet changes can alter the perceived prob-
ability of default. The dynamics of the initial debt stock are subject to the following






0, ps, r and g denote the initial debt stock (here total public-debt-to-GDP),
the primary surplus (all primary revenues minus costs, excluding debt-servicing
costs), the interest rate paid (ex-post interest rate on public debt) and the country’s
growth rate. Public ﬁnances are generally considered as "sustainable" if the public
debt stock relative to GDP (at least) stays constant and the inequality above holds.
By contrast, if this solvency ratio rises, the country is getting more indebted and its
probability of default is expected to rise, resulting in higher sovereign credit spreads.
Cabinet changes aﬀecting the minister of ﬁnance or economics can alter expec-
tations and hence sovereign spreads through two major channels. First, changing
ﬁnance ministers can signal markets a changing stance on ﬁscal austerity and the
12Edwards (1984) considers multiple, risk-neutral investors that compete for bonds in hard cur-
rency to borrower countries. We can write the emerging market yield (i) as the risk free yield
(i*) and a credit spread (s) that compensates investors for the default risk i = i¤ + s. For sim-
plicity, assuming that the recovery rate in case of default is zero, even though this assumption
is not essential for the results. The following no-arbitrage relation must hold for the next period:
(1 + i)(1 ¡ pd) = (1 + i¤).
13More precisely, adverse news on the country’s creditworthiness leads to a decline in bond prices
and hence an increase in yields-to-maturity and bond spreads, respectively.
8government’s willingness to service its debt. This channel hinges on signals about
the future course of ﬁscal policy and hence the expected primary budgetary sur-
plus. This budgetary balance before interest payments is central for two reasons:
First, the lion’s share of the interest bill has to be covered by the primary surplus.14
Second, the primary surplus is ultimately the result of political priorities. The in-
cumbent government has to weigh up domestic absorption against its debt servicing
capacity. In a presidential system, a ﬁnance minister change is often the result of
the executive’s vanishing support for his minister, which may creep in over time or
may happen surprisingly.
The second channel stresses that changing economy ministers can lead to dete-
riorating growth prospects due to policy uncertainty and cause higher bond spreads.
Rodrik (1991) shows that uncertainty about the future policy and the lasting power
of reforms can have the detrimental eﬀect on private investment, impairing a coun-
try’s growth prospects. 15
We expect the ﬁrst channel to be the dominant one, since a ﬁnance minister has
a more direct eﬀect on ﬁscal and debt sustainability than a economics minister.16 A
priori the direction of the eﬀect is not clear, but conditional on the type of minister
("conservative" vs. "non-conservative") both channels point in the same direction.
We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: Investors react negatively (positively) to signals
within the government, if the new minister is expected to be
less (more) "conservative", indicating changes in the ﬁscal policy
and willingness-to-pay.
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) propose a theoretical model that accounts for
the lack of ﬁnancial depth in emerging economies. If the supply of funds available
to the government and private sector of an emerging market is i) controlled by a
14This holds true as long as seignorage gains are negligible due to low inﬂation or the government
abstains from rolling over the debt by issuing new bonds (see for instance Grandes, 2002).
15Furthermore, policy uncertainty may also trigger capital ﬂight (see for instance Lensink and
Hermes (2001)).
16In the case of so-called "super ministers" both administrative competencies are uniﬁed in one
ministry. This can be observed for instance in Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay.
9small set of specialized investors and ii) limited, ﬁscal fears can amplify crowding-out
eﬀects and lower the valuation of the country’s assets. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1b: Investors react negatively to signals of a lack of
ﬁscal discipline of the government.
For our second hypothesis we retreat to Aizenman and Powell (1998) who stress
that a government is not a uniﬁed force, but a set of competing groups. Hence, the
ﬁscal budget is the outcome of an internal political process. If the center (ﬁnance
ministry) is weak, the competition for scarce funds can lead to strong bias towards
overspending, pushing the country to its credit ceiling. "Weakness" is deﬁned as
(i) the inability to detect overspending and (ii) the lack of power or will to punish
non-cooperative behavior of the opportunistic group. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Investors negatively price in signals of a weak
ministry of ﬁnance.
4 Data, estimation strategy and results
4.1 Data description and sources
Our analysis is based on several types of data. We employ sovereign bond spread
indices from J.P. Morgan as our dependent variable. Concretely, we use the fol-
lowing sovereign bond spread data: the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI),
the Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) and the Emerging Markets Bond
Global (EMBIG).17 A country-speciﬁc EMBI sub-index, expressed in basis points, is
the yield diﬀerence between the weighted average of external-currency-denominated
individual bonds issued by a particular country and a comparable risk-free U.S.
bond. Only sovereign bonds that comply with well-deﬁned liquidity requirements are
17Henceforth, the notion EMBI is used synonymously for EMBI, EMBI+ and EMBIG. We mainly
rely on the EMBI+ due to his relatively large coverage in Latin America, his liquidity requirements
and his record up to date. Bond spread data from the early 1990s are obtained from EMBI. For
Chile, Dominican Republic and Uruguay only EMBIG data is available.
10eligible for J.P. Morgan’s bond indices.18 These country indices are closely watched
indicators for perceived country risk or default risk in emerging markets. The Fi-
nancial Times once called the yield spread "the most widely accepted measure of
political risk" (Financial Times, 2003).
The sample covers all daily bond spreads available for Latin America, span-
ning the following twelve countries for the period 1992-2007: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Uruguay and Venezuela. Appendix 1 gives an exact listing of the available data.
Appendices (2) and (3) provide summary statistics on the bond spreads for the
respective empirical approaches to be discussed below. The sample is fairly homoge-
nous with respect to the political system. All countries are set up as a presidential
system,19 where a single executive is elected (directly or indirectly through an as-
sembly) by popular vote. The president is the head of the government and exerts
direct power over the cabinet by directly appointing and dismissing ministers.
A newly-collected sample on cabinet changes involving ﬁnance or economics min-
isters in Latin America lies at the heart of our data set. It is important to note that
we solely consider minister changes (with constitutional means) during the legislative
period. Cabinet announcements following presidential elections, a normal political
process in democracies, are not considered.20 We have drawn on various sources.21
Our data crucially depends upon a full-text research on the Economist, the Wall
Street Journal and the Financial Times through the online data base provider Lex-
18Instruments in the EMBI+ have to exceed the issue amount of USD 500 millions and must
be available and liquid. The average bid/oﬀer spread has to be smaller than 1.5 basis points. Sy
(2001) concludes that EMBI spreads have consequently little or similar liquidity risk premia. For
this reason we can assume that the impact of liquidity risk on the total country risk premium is
negligible. For a more comprehensive discussion on the the total country (risk) premium, see for
instance Peter (2005).
19The Database on Political Institutions (DPI) categorizes all sample countries as „direct pres-
idential“ and shows a high degree of political contest, with nearly all countries included scoring
7 out of 7, for both indicators on political competitiveness, namely the Legislative and Executive
Index on Political Competitiveness, respectively.
20While we do not deny heightened political or devaluation risk during (presidential) elections
times in emerging markets, as evidenced for instance by Bussiere and Mulder (2000) or Stein and
Streb (2004), we argue instead that elections and political or cabinet crises (as reﬂected in the
ﬁnance minister change) constitute two diﬀerent types of political instability.
21In a ﬁrst step, we have analyzed the respective "country chronicle" in various issues of the
Fischer Weltalmanach (1993-2005). All major political and economical events are documented.
11isNexis. These important ﬁnancial news-papers are backed by other press sources
available through LexisNexis, if necessary. All in all, this procedure yields 66 cabinet
reshuﬄes aﬀecting the ministry of ﬁnance or economics. Appendices 4 and 5 show
the number of observations per country and give details on the events, including the
minister’s name, position and date of departure.22
We also employ a series of control variables. The sovereign rating data is obtained
from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) website.23 Sy (2001) ﬁnds an explanatory power
of country ratings for EMBI+ spreads. We include announcements of rating actions
by S&P, which cover changes in the actual rating, rating outlooks, and watch listings,
since they have proven to aﬀect bond markets in the short term.24 We also control
for US ﬁnancial market indicators like the yield of 10-year US Treasury bonds and 3-
month US Treasury bills. Both variables are widely used to control for international
liquidity. Finally, we add the volatility index (VIX) of the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE) as a proxy for ﬁnancial market uncertainty. The VIX measures
the implied volatility from option contracts on the Standard and Poor’s 100 (S&P
100) index. First suggested by Duecker (1999) and for instance employed by IMF
(2001) in a study on sovereign bond spread spreads, this index gives an idea about
the market expectation of the volatility of the S&P 100 in the subsequent month.
The VIX can be interpreted as a forward looking indicator on global risk aversion.
Summary statistics for all control variables are provided in Appendices 2 and 3.
4.2 First evidence
We provide ﬁrst evidence by comparing the average pre-event level of bond spreads
with the corresponding post-event level. Table 1 summarizes the results. The mean-
comparison tests show that the average pre-event spread level is signiﬁcantly higher
22Beyond this reliable information further details on the type of departure (resignation vs. forced
resignation) and the information content (anticipated vs. non-anticipated) have to be interpreted
more cautiously, since news paper articles do not allow deﬁnite classiﬁcations.
23For further details see http://www2.standardandpoors.com.
24Gande and Parsley (2004, 2005) ﬁnd that S&P is more active in making rating changes and of-
ten precedes other companies’ rating adjustments. Generally speaking, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s
Investor Service and Fitch Investor Service are widely regarded as the three major international
players for sovereign risk ratings making up for about 80 per cent of the market.
12than the post-event level.
Table 1: Mean-Comparison tests of bond spreads (in basis points).
Sample Period -20/+20 -40/+40 -60/+60 -80/+80
Full sample 88** 137*** 153*** 148***
Full without extreme 39** 66*** 78*** 74***
Non-Crisis only 28** 47*** 56*** 52***
Crisis only 184** 283*** 312*** 307***
Crisis without extreme 64** 110*** 127*** 123***
Mean-comparison tests for pre-event versus post-event periods of equal length.
Absolute average diﬀerence between periods in basis points displayed.
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of signiﬁcance.
This diﬀerence in levels is robust to diﬀerent sample deﬁnitions ranging from the full
sample to a non-crisis sample and the inclusion or exclusion of extreme observations
(observations with average bond spreads above 2000 basis points or default episodes).
For the time window of principal interest (-40 to +40) t-tests are robust on the 1%-
level independently of the sample deﬁnition, with absolute spread diﬀerences varying
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Figure 1: Non-Parametric Analysis
This ﬁrst impression of higher bond spreads in the post-event period is conﬁrmed
graphically. We employ a non-parametric analysis of the time trends. In Figure 1
13the smoothed bond spread values are plotted on the Y-axis against the day counter
on the X-axis. Bond spreads exhibit a strong increase before the cabinet reshuﬄe
and a slow but steady decline in the second half of the post-event window.
4.3 Estimation strategy
We employ two diﬀerent methodologies. First, we estimate the announcement eﬀect
of the minister change. Second, we perform panel regressions to test for trending
behavior of spreads before and after the political event.
4.3.1 Contemporaneous eﬀect
We ﬁrst study the daily reaction of sovereign bond spreads to the political event.
The following regression (equation 1) is estimated by pooled OLS25
¢Yi;t = ® + ¸¢Yi;t¡1 + ¯CABINETi;t + °c¢Xc;t + ºwDw + ²i;t; (1)
where the subscripts i an t indicate country and time, respectively. Yi;t is the de-
pendent variable, the EMBI bond spread, denoted in log-diﬀerences. Our variable
of interest CABINET stands for a cabinet change involving a ﬁnance or economics
minister.26 The variable takes the value of one on the day of the change (t) and the
day after (t+1). The careful build-up of the data base allows us to pinpoint the day
of the announcement. However, we are (in most cases) not able to identify the exact
hour. Since the EMBI bond spread indices are calculated at 3pm Eastern Time, we
cannot be sure that the public news arriving at time t is also priced in at time t.
For this reason, we extend the event window by one day.
For our variable of main interest Hypothesis 1a does not determine a priori the
direction of the eﬀect, if there are any level-eﬀects. On the one hand, bond spreads
are expected to decrease (¯<0) in response to the dismissal of a less conservative
25The fact that we use daily data does not allow us to control for country fundamentals, which
are typically reported on a lower frequency.
26We assume that this variable is exogenous. It seems highly implausible that a minister change
is triggered by daily changes in the country’s spread.
14minister or "ﬁscal dove". On the other hand, the sacking of a "conservative" min-
ister or "ﬁscal hawk" is expected to send negative signals to the markets, resulting
in a spike in bond spreads (¯>0). Since we abstain from classifying the minister
changes into "good" and "bad" ones in the baseline speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient ¯
will necessarily comprise both eﬀects. If we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant daily impact of
the minister change on bond spreads, this may be grounded on three diﬀerent rea-
sons: (i) the opposite eﬀects cancel each other out; (ii) this kind of political news is
not a determinant for bond spreads; or (iii) ﬁnancial markets have fully anticipated
the political event. Hypothesis 1b and 2 oﬀer clear predictions. If Hypotheses 1b or
2 holds, we will expect a rise in bond spreads (¯>0).
The dependent variable also enters the equation lagged by one period. It is
possible that a correlation between the lagged bond spreads and the error term exists.
To correct for this possible bias, we use a further lagged value as an instrument for
the lagged dependent variable in a robustness check. Furthermore, our regression
includes X, a vector of up to four of the following control variables. The variable
¢USYield stands for the log-diﬀerence of the 10-year US Treasury yield.27 Economic
theory suggests a positive eﬀect of U.S. interest rates on emerging market bond
spreads. The main reason is that a rise in U.S. interest rates increases the debt burden
for an emerging market government and, hence, negatively aﬀects the capacity to
repay its debt.28 We also include the log changes of the 3-month US T-bills to control
for US interest rates with a short maturity. Additionally, the variable ¢VIX stands
for log changes in the volatility index, proxying for time varying risk appetite of
international investors. We expect a positive coeﬃcient for the volatility variable.
Finally, the variable Rating action takes the value 1 (-1) for upgrades (downgrades)
in the actual foreign currency sovereign ratings or their outlooks and 0 otherwise.
If rating changes convey new information, we expect the coeﬃcient to be negative.
Finally, we employ dummy variables Dw, running from Monday to Thursday, in
order to control for week-day-eﬀects.
27We deﬁne the variable USYield as 100 ¤ log(1 + iUS
t ).
28For more details see Kamin and von Kleist (1999) and Arora and Cerisola (2001).
15Next, we provide a number of robustness checks. Our speciﬁcation changes to:
¢Yi;t = ® + ¸¢Yi;t¡1 + ¯1CABINETi;t + ¯2CABINETi;t ¤ CHARACTi;t +
+ °c¢Xc;t + ºwDw + ²i;t; (2)
where CHARACTi;t are dummies that take the value of one if one of the following
characteristics holds true and zero otherwise. ECONOMICSi;t stands for a cabinet
reshuﬄe that only aﬀects the ministry of economics but not the ﬁnance ministry.
CORRUPTi;t represents minister changes due to alleged corruption, allowing for
a distinction between "good" and "bad" ministers. One might expect a negative
sign for the interaction coeﬃcient. CRISISi;t proxies for debt crisis. Our deﬁnition
follows Sy (2004), who deﬁnes debt crisis as a sovereign default or secondary market
spreads above 1000 basis points.29 Consequently, our dummy variable CRISISi;t
takes the value of one if the average bond spreads are above 1000 basis points in the
month preceding the cabinet change and zero otherwise.
Finally, we add a further variable to our matrix of control variables in order
to take movements in the sovereign bond market into account. We cannot directly
include the EMBI overall index in our speciﬁcation, because it would - by deﬁ-
nition - cause endogeneity problems, since our dependent variable is part of the
market. Hence, we follow Dell’Ariccia et al. (2006) by including the residual from a
regression of the respective dependent variable on the market, whereby EMBIi;t
and EMBI_Latini;t stand for the world market and the Latin American market,
respectively.
4.3.2 Trend behavior
Second, we employ a diﬀerent panel approach. Following for instance Block and
Vaaler (2004) we resort to a ﬂexible General Estimating Equation (GEE) approach.
The GEE procedure provides linear model estimates, with independent correlation
structures and semi-robust standard errors for deﬁned groups. Furthermore, the
29Sy (2004) and Pescatori and Sy (2004) argue that their results are in favor of interpreting the
1000 basis points mark for bond spreads as a psychological barrier for market participants.
16GEE allows for ﬁrst through tenth-order autocorrelation adjustment of errors terms
for observations in each group.30 We examine whether spreads exhibit a trend be-
havior and, if so, whether this trend is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the run-up of ﬁnance
minister changes as compared to a post-event period of equal length. Equation (3)
is our baseline speciﬁcation
Yi;t = ® + ¯1CABINETi;t + ¯2(CABINET ¤ POSTDAY )i;t + (3)
+ ÁCRISISi;t + ±Countryi + »Y eart + ui;t:
The dependent variable, Yi;t, is once more the respective sovereign bond spread sub-
index.31 Our independent variables of main interest are two variables that gauge
time trends in the bond spreads. The ﬁrst time variable, CABINETi;t, is a day
counter running from 40 days before to 40 days after the political event.32 The
second time variable interacts the ﬁrst time variable with a dummy variable called
POSTDAY i;t, which takes a value of one if the day is after the political event and
zero otherwise. This allows us to test for a structural break in the time trend on the
day of the minister change. The parameter estimate ¯1 represents the overall time
trend during the estimation window, while the post-event bond spreads slope can
be calculated as the sum of the two parameter estimates, ¯1 + ¯2. Additionally, we
incorporate dummies to control for ﬁxed Country and Year eﬀects as well as periods
of crises.
The regression speciﬁcation (4) allows for diﬀerent slope coeﬃcients for tranquil
periods and periods of ﬁnancial distress by interacting the two existing time trend
30Block and Vaaler (2004) assess the impact of presidential elections on bond spreads. Hardin
and Hilbe (2003) oﬀer further details on this panel estimator, which can be performed in STATA
through "xtgee".
31Standard augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests yielded mixed results in our case,
which may be due to the low power of standard unit root tests. Independent of that we abstain from
pursuing cointegration analysis because a priori we expect interest rates - and all the more bond
spreads - to be I(0). Cochrane (1991) stresses that interest rates are almost certainly stationary
in levels since interest rates nowadays are comparable to interest rates in medieval times. Chances
that any random walk process would yield such a pattern are very slim.
32We found no guidance in the literature for choosing the length of the event window. Our results
are robust to any pre-event and post-event period of equal length between 30 to 50 days.
17variables with our debt crisis dummy variable.33
Yi;t = ® + ¯1CABINETi;t + ¯2(CABINET ¤ POSTDAY )i;t + (4)
+ ¯3(CABINET ¤ CRISIS)i;t + ¯4(CABINET ¤ POSTDAY ¤ CRISIS)i;t +
+ ÁCRISISi;t + °cXc;t + ±Countryi + »Y eart + ui;t:
We add step by step the same control variables as in the preceding section, namely
U.S. interest rates (10-year U.S. Treasury bonds and 3-month U.S. T-bills) and the
volatility index (VIX), and expect the same signs for the coeﬃcients.
Finally, we will exclude all those observations from our main analysis that oc-
curred in times of severe debt crisis or (imminent) default (7 events), such as the
resignation of Argentine ﬁnance minister Domingo Cavallo (and his cabinet) in De-
cember 2001 with bond spreads around 4000 basis points. To foreshadow the results,
our ﬁndings are not driven by such extreme events.34
4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Contemporaneous eﬀect
We start by looking at the contemporaneous impact of changes in the ﬁnance min-
istry. Table 2 reports the panel regression results. Column (1) shows that bond
spreads exhibit some persistence, with the lagged dependent variable being signif-
icant at the ten percent level. The coeﬃcient on cabinet change is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level over diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
33The results are robust to the alternative deﬁnition of the average two preceding months.
34In this context, we come back to the assumption of exogeneity for our variable cabinet change.
It seems highly unlikely that a ﬁnance minister will be forced out of oﬃce due to "normal" variation
in bond spreads over the period of two months. Even in the case of (very) high and rising bond
spreads the reasoning in favor of reversed causality is far from clear-cut (in the short run). The
pressure on budgetary discipline that potentially makes the ﬁnance minister vulnerable to power
struggles within the government still depends largely on a country’s debt structure. The impact
on ongoing debt servicing costs will be the higher, the larger the outstanding debt, the part of
outstanding debt linked to ﬂoating domestic interest rates35 and the greater the country’s need
to tap international capital markets through a bond issuance in the near future. To mitigate such
endogeneity concerns, we exclude extreme events.
18Table 2: Panel Regression Results Finance and Economics Minister Changes
Alternative Speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV
¢ log Spread, lagged 0.0316* 0.0329* 0.0312* 0.0314* 0.0474
(1.99) (2.08) (1.99) (2.01) (0.12)
Cabinet 0.0100** 0.0098** 0.0095** 0.0099** 0.0098**
(2.88) (2.92) (2.95) (3.13) (2.94)
¢ log US T-bond 10 years -0.0040* -0.0032 -0.0032
(2.16) (1.74) (1.72)
¢ log US T-bill 3 months -0.0022*** -0.0011*** -0.0011***
(6.25) (6.20) (3.76)
¢ log VIX 0.1270*** 0.1217*** 0.1217***
(11.21) (9.20) (9.70)
Rating action -0.0179*** -0.0177***
(4.26) (3.37)
Observations 32195 32195 32195 32195 32187
R-squared 0.017 0.007 0.045 0.058 0.058
The dependent variable is in (log) changes. Results are based on clustered robust standard
errors. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. The variable cabinet change takes the value
one on the day of the cabinet change (t) and the day after (t+1) and zero otherwise.
Week-day eﬀects and a constant are estimated but not reported. The instrumental variable
(IV) estimation in column (5) uses the second lag of the dependent variable as instrument.
Testing for ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in the error terms via "areg" indicates no ﬁrst
order correlation.
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of signiﬁcance.
Investors apparently view such cabinet changes negatively, with bond spreads rising
on average by about one percent upwards on the announcement day. Hence, a ﬁnance
minister change tends to signal a worsening willingness-to-pay and/or is seen a sign
of weakness of the treasury.
Taking into consideration that we abstained from classifying the political events
into positive and negative ones, this result is remarkable. The overall negative eﬀect
on the spread is partly oﬀset by positively perceived minister changes for which we
are not controlling. This conjecture is conﬁrmed by Table 3, which shows that in
one out of three cabinet changes spreads actually fall on the event day.
Table 3: Short-term Market Reactions to Finance and Economics Minister Changes
x < 3% 3% > x < 7% 7% > x < 20% x > 20% Sum
Rising Spreads 26 11 8 2 47
Falling Spreads 12 7 3 0 22
Sum 38 18 11 2 69
Cumulative daily changes of bond spreads (in percent) on the day of the cabinet change (t)
and the day after (t+1).
19Coming back to Table 2, the coeﬃcient on the 10-year US Treasury bond rate is on
the verge of the 10 percent signiﬁcance level for most speciﬁcations and displays an
unexpected negative sign. We would have expected that higher U.S. interest rates
lead to higher bond spreads. Interestingly, the same ﬁnding applies to the highly
signiﬁcant 3-month US Treasury rate, which we add as another control variable in
column (2): We ﬁnd an unexpected negative impact of the U.S. interest rate.36 The
third column adds the volatility index (VIX) as an additional explanatory variable
to the baseline speciﬁcation. As expected, a higher expected volatility in U.S. mar-
kets leads to an increase in emerging markets spreads at 1 percent conﬁdence level.
In column (4) we incorporate all control variables, including the rating announce-
ment variable, which shows up highly signiﬁcantly and with the expected negative
sign. Finally, column (5) reports the results obtained from instrumental variable es-
timation. We control for the potential biases by instrumenting the lagged dependent
variable by its second lag. All major ﬁndings hold for the two-stage least squares
estimation.
Finally, Table 4 provides a number of robustness tests to our baseline speciﬁca-
tion. Column (1) conﬁrms the conjecture that the channel via the ministry of ﬁnance
dominates the channel via the ministry of economics. Once we control for economics
minister changes, the isolated negative announcement eﬀect stays signiﬁcant on a 5
percent level and even slightly increases in magnitude. We conclude that investors
are mainly concerned about the future ﬁscal policy stance and marginal changes in
the willingness-to-pay. Column (2) oﬀers a proxy for "bad" ministers. Interestingly,
we ﬁnd that minister changes due to alleged corruption are indeed signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from other minister resignations. However, such changes - on average - do
not impact markets (¯1 + ¯2 = ¡0:002). Column (3) explicitly controls for minister
changes during debt crisis. The announcement eﬀect proves robust to this modiﬁca-
tion, even though the level of signiﬁcance decreases to 1 percent. Finally, Columns
(4) and (5) seek to control for market movements, by introducing the residual of the
36In the previous literature Eichengreen and Mody (1998) and Kamin and von Kleist (1999)
also found a negative correlation between U.S. interest rates and emerging market spreads, while
Ferrucci (2003) and Arora and Cerisola (2001) report the expected positive correlations.
20Table 4: Panel Regression Results Finance and Economics Minister Changes II
Alternative Speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
¢ log Spread, lagged 0.0314* 0.0314* 0.0314* 0.0335** 0.0333**
(2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.25) (2.28)
Cabinet 0.0109** 0.0107*** 0.0089* 0.0095*** 0.0096***











¢ log US T-bond 10 years -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0031
(1.74) (1.74) (1.74) (1.76) (1.79)
¢ log US T-bill 3 months -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011***
(6.20) (6.21) (6.20) (7.30) (7.43)
¢ log VIX 0.1217*** 0.1218*** 0.1217*** 0.1264*** 0.1271***
(9.20) (9.20) (9.19) (7.94) (7.85)
Rating action -0.0179*** -0.0179*** -0.0179*** -0.0175*** -0.0175***
(4.26) (4.26) (4.26) (4.51) (4.52)
Observations 32195 32195 32195 32195 32195
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.059
The dependent variable is in (log) changes. Results are based on clustered robust standard
errors. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. The variable cabinet change takes the value
one on the day of the cabinet change (t) and the day after (t+1) and zero otherwise.
Week-day eﬀects and a constant are estimated but not reported. Testing for ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation in the error terms via "areg" indicates no ﬁrst order correlation.
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of signiﬁcance.
EMBI and the EMBI Latin. All major results hold for these robustness checks.
4.4.2 Trend behavior
Next we discuss the results from the GEE panel regressions. The ﬁrst column of
Table 5 refers to equation (3) based on the full sample, namely 66 cabinet changes.
Our event window spans from 40 days before the cabinet change involving a ﬁnance
minister to 40 days after.37 While the pre-event slope estimate is positive (¯1=5.60)
at the 1 percent level, indicating a rising trend in the bond spread, the post-event
slope is negative (¯2=-4.91) at the 5 percent level.
37All main results of this study hold, when we only consider so-called "clean events", i.e. ﬁnance
minister changes do not overlap in the windows of +/- 40 days. If we were to allow for overlapping
windows, the events would be serially correlated and estimated coeﬃcients would exhibit a bias.
21Table 5: Panel regression results trending behavior
Alternative Speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cabinet 5.60*** 2.43*** 2.17*** 1.63*** 1.57**
(3.48) (3.17) (3.13) (2.73) (2.33)
Cabinet*Postday -4.91** -1.71* -1.47* -1.16 -0.88
(2.37) (1.71) (1.70) (1.44) (1.02)
US T-bond 10 years -19.06 25.91 23.06
(0.34) (0.58) (0.47)
US T-bill 3 months 30.09 16.67 9.04
(0.58) (0.35) (0.18)




Crisis 1195.81*** 445.06*** 424.22*** 426.74*** 258.47***
(4.76) (8.70) (7.38) (6.70) (2.90)
Constant 885.05*** 774.50*** 408.37 -135.51 -69.88
(4.60) (9.21) (1.17) (0.50) (0.25)
Observations 5214 4661 4661 4661 3871
Groups 66 59 59 59 49
Results are based on population-averaged panel data model. Stata’s General Estimating
Equation (GEE) procedure provides general linear model estimates, allows for independent
correlation structures for each of the cabinet change groups, and provides semi-robust
standard errors. Semi-robust standard-errors are adjusted for clustering and equation
error terms are adjusted for ﬁrst through seventh order autocorrelation (AR7). Country
and year dummy variables are included but not reported. Re-estimations for the time
windows 6 - 10 weeks are very similar and available from the author on request.
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of signiﬁcance.
This means that the post-event slope is statistically diﬀerent from the overall trend
during the event window. By summing up the two coeﬃcients we get a slope point
estimate, which is marginally positive (¯1+¯2=+0.69). In other words, bond spreads
on average trend upwards and remain at a higher level in the aftermath of the
political turmoil. In column (2) we exclude all extreme events. Not surprisingly,
the size of the slope coeﬃcient as well as the magnitude of the dummy variable
crisis decrease substantially. The overall picture remains the same. Bond spreads
trend upwards in the up-run and level-out on a higher level thereafter. Bond spreads
trend on average 2.43 basis points per day upwards in the 40 days before the cabinet
change, resulting in an increase of nearly 100 basis points. Spreads tend to continue
to increase by a small margin thereafter (2.43-1.71=0.72). Next, we add a number of
ﬁnancial market indicators as control variables in column (3). While neither short-
22term nor long-term U.S. interest seem to explain the emerging markets time trend
around the event window, the volatility index is highly signiﬁcant.
Turning to column (4) we further include the residual of the EMBI in order to
control for market developments in the same asset class. While the EMBI indeed
shows up highly signiﬁcant, the post-event slope coeﬃcient and the volatility index
turn insigniﬁcant. Still, the general picture of the trending behavior remains, even
though the structural break is not signiﬁcant any longer.
Finally, in column (5) we exclude cabinet changes that solely involve the ministry
of economics in order to isolate the impact of ﬁnance minister changes on sovereign
bond markets. Indeed, once more it turns out that the overall eﬀect seems to be
driven by ﬁnance minister changes, indicating that concerns about the ﬁscal policy
course and the government’s willingness-to-pay move markets.
Table 6 presents the results of equation (4),where we allow for diﬀerent slope
coeﬃcients for tranquil times and periods of debt crises. While the pre-event slope
coeﬃcient for tranquil times shows a slight upward trend and is at least once signif-
icant at the 10 percent level, the post-event coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant at conven-
tional levels. It does not come as a surprise that ﬁnancial markets in normal times do
not show any remarkable trending behavior during the event window. Market par-
ticipants are apparently not sensitive to political instability in the "medium term",
i.e. over two months following the minister change, if the fundamentals, as reﬂected
in the relatively low level of country spreads, are relatively strong.
In contrast to that we do ﬁnd a pronounced trending eﬀect for periods of ﬁ-
nancial distress. The pre-event and post-event slope coeﬃcients are statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively, and can be computed in the
following way to get a better idea about the magnitude of the eﬀect for debt crisis.
For the speciﬁcation in column (4) we get a pre-event slope coeﬃcient in height
of 4.25 (¯1+¯3=0.49+3.76=4.25) and a post-event slope coeﬃcient in height of -
1.21 (¯1+¯2+¯3+¯4=0.49+0.73+4.25-6.19=-1.21). This implies that sovereign bond
spreads trend upwards by about 170 basis points (4.25*40) in the up-run and fall
again by about roughly 50 basis points (-1.21*40) in the aftermath of a cabinet
23Table 6: Panel regression results trending behavior II
Alternative Speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cabinet 0.86* 0.86 0.73 0.49 0.46
(1.64) (1.63) (1.53) (1.36) (1.17)
Cabinet*Postday 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.73 0.99
(0.66) (0.66) (0.72) (1.25) (1.62)
Cabinet*Crisis 12.54*** 5.16** 4.76** 3.76** 4.67**
(3.39) (2.54) (2.50) (2.22) (2.01)
Cabinet*Postday*Crisis -14.26*** -7.38*** -6.19*** -6.19*** -7.74***
(2.92) (2.83) (2.77) (3.34) (3.60)
US T-bond 10 years -10.06 26.40 29.19
(0.18) (0.56) (0.58)
US T-bill 3 months 35.74 20.76 12.73
(0.65) (0.41) (0.24)




Crisis 1336.65*** 517.90*** 486.66*** 488.27*** 337.02***
(4.76) (8.07) (7.43) (6.99) (3.30)
Constant 831.70*** 752.27*** 316.32 -166.77 -116.28
(4.46) (9.32) (1.17) (0.55) (0.39)
Observations 5214 4661 4661 4661 3871
Groups 66 59 59 59 49
Results are based on population-averaged panel data model. Stata’s General Estimating
Equation (GEE) procedure provides general linear model estimates, allows for independent
correlation structures for each of the cabinet change groups, and provides semi-robust
standard errors. Semi-robust standard-errors are adjusted for clustering and equation
error terms are adjusted for ﬁrst through seventh order autocorrelation (AR7). Country
and year dummy variables are included but not reported. Re-estimations for the time
windows 6 - 10 weeks are very similar and available from the author on request.
***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of signiﬁcance.
reshuﬄe involving the minster of ﬁnance or economics. Hence, the GEE results in-
dicate that the spread level in the period after a cabinet change is on average about
120 basis points higher during times of ﬁnancial distress than before the change.
This estimate conﬁrms our impression from the mean-comparison tests (110 basis
points). Column (5) once more highlights that ﬁnance minister changes and uncer-
tainty about the ﬁscal policy drive the results.
To summarize, we ﬁnd evidence that bond spreads exhibit an upwards trend in
the weeks running up to the cabinet reshuﬄe involving a ﬁnance and/or economy
minister, before remaining at a higher spread level in the aftermath. Even though
24bond spreads tend to fall in the two months following the minister change, the
decrease in spreads only recoups about one third of its preceding rise. In this sense,
political uncertainty apparently persists for several weeks. These results apply to
periods of heightened economic vulnerability but are not driven by extreme periods
of ﬁnancial distress. For tranquil periods we ﬁnd no systematic time trend.
5 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that political instability, captured by a cabinet reshuf-
ﬂe involving the minister of ﬁnance or economics, matters to international investors.
On the announcement day of the minister change we ﬁnd a rise in bond spreads
of roughly one percentage point. Such an instantaneous negative reaction of ﬁnan-
cial markets conﬁrms anecdotic evidence from the ﬁnancial press. Interestingly, a
ﬁnancial press report (Financial Times, 2006) shows that a remarkable widening
in Brazilian bond spreads due to the resignation of Antonio Palocci, the investor-
friendly Brazilian ﬁnance minister, even though this event has been largely antici-
pated. Furthermore, mean-comparison tests show that the average bond spread level
is signiﬁcantly higher in the aftermath of the political event than before. This level
eﬀect is robust to diﬀerent time periods and sample deﬁnitions. Beyond this level-
eﬀect, we ﬁnd for crisis events that bond spreads signiﬁcantly trend upward in the
40 days leading up to the political event before partially ebbing away in the 40 days
following the cabinet change. For the overall sample and the debt crisis sample (ex-
cluding extreme events) bond spreads trend upwards by about 100 (170) basis points
in the up-run, implying a substantial increase in reﬁnancing costs for the aﬀected
country.
We conclude that investors are apparently sensitive to signals within the gov-
ernment. In particular, ﬁnance minister changes are viewed negatively, since they
put the future ﬁscal policy stance and a country’s willingness-to-pay into question.
This negative eﬀect is also in line with the interpretation of fears about the ﬁscal
responsibility of the incumbent government or signs of weakness for the treasury. We
25ﬁnd that investors’ demand for higher yields especially plays a prominent role when
countries’ fundamentals are in the middle ground, i.e. their spreads signal some eco-
nomic vulnerability but no sovereign default is imminent. This interpretation is in
line with second-generation crisis models. We coin this "political risk premium".
Could this indicator of political instability serve as an explanatory variable in
an early warning system (EWS)? In fact, both debt crisis episodes in Latin America
in the last few years were preceded by a cabinet change aﬀecting the ministry of
ﬁnance. The resignation of Domingo Cavallo and the entire De La Rua cabinet came
only a few days before the new government declared a debt moratorium in December
2001. Similarly, the Ecuadorian ﬁnance minister explicitly stepped back in summer
1999, declaring his reluctance to back discrimination between diﬀerent groups of
investors. Shortly later, such a partial default was announced by the Ecuadorian
president. While the limited data set allows only for cautious conclusions on the
predictive power of political instability, country risk analysts may interpret these
results as an alert to scrutinize the ﬁscal position of the respective country.
There are several potential extensions to this paper. Future research may test
whether international investors are more sensitive to political instability when coun-
tries have a repudiation as so-called "serial defaulters". Expanding the current data
set to include all major emerging markets would allow to examine this question.
Another interesting question would be to analyze if there is evidence for "political
contagion". Are there negative spillover eﬀects on bond spreads for one emerging
market when a country within the same region suﬀers from a political crisis? Fur-
thermore, there is still relatively little known about factors driving daily volatility
in emerging markets. Further research would be obviously desirable.
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Appendix 1: Data Availability daily EMBI bond spreads





Dominican Republic 30-Nov-01 21-Sept-07
Ecuador 30-Jun-95 21-Sept-07






Appendix 2: Summary Statistics for First-diﬀerences-approach in Logarithms
Mean Standard Min Max Number
Deviation of Obs.
Log change in bond spreads -0.00026 0.0332 -1.9824 1.0601 32195
Log change US Note 10 years -0.00006 0.0102 -0.0395 0.3144 32195
Log change US Bill 3 months -0.00001 0.0099 -0.1307 0.1002 32195
Log change VIX -0.00005 0.0546 -0.2998 0.4960 32195
Summary statistics for changes in logarithm (ﬁrst-diﬀerences-approach). Daily observations from 1992
to 2007. The US yields are expressed in percentage points.
Appendix 3: Summary Statistics for GEE Panel Regressions
Mean Standard Min Max Number
Deviation of Obs.
Bond spreads (bps) 80 days full sample 1083.34 1009.23 72 7220 10607
Bond spreads (bps) 80 days reduced sample 804.84 469.09 72 2941 9480
Bond spreads (bps) 40 days full sample 1110.79 1033.26 77 6239 5214
Bond spreads (bps) 40 days reduced sample 812.58 475.96 77 2941 4661
US Note 10 years (percent) 5.42 1.05 3.1 8.03 10607
US Bill 3 months (percent) 3.71 1.59 0.8 6.24 10607
VIX 19.74 6.87 9.31 45.74 10607
Summary statistics for GEE-approach. Control variables are derived from the 80 days full sample period.
Diﬀerences to the 40 days sample are not reported but negligible. The US yields are expressed in
percent. Reduced sample refers to the sample excluding periods of extreme ﬁnancial distress or default.
Appendix 4: Number of political events by country
Country Total Events Country Total Events
Argentina 7 (5) Mexico 4 (4)
Brazil 8 (8) Panama 3 (3)
Chile 2 (2) Peru 7 (7)
Colombia 3 (3) Uruguay 2 (2)
Dominican Republic 2 (2) Venezuela 14 (13)
Ecuador 14 (10)
El Salvador 0 (0) Total Events 66 (59)
Number of cabinet changes involving ﬁnance or economics minister reported for period
1992-2007. The events are domestic events. Number of observations in parentheses
constitutes the reduced sample excluding events of extreme ﬁnancial distress and default.
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